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This paper examines how perceived trustworthiness affects small firm owners’ selection of business 
advisors using strong ties and how the strength of tie affects the evaluation of the advisor’s 
performance. Differences between professional advisors (consultants, accountants, public enterprise 
support officers) and informal advisors (family members, friends) are investigated in this context. 
Hypotheses are tested with survey data comprising 153 young Finnish businesses. The results show 
that owner-managers think that advisors selected with strong ties perform better, and perceived 
benevolence of the advisor is the most important trust criterion when using a strong tie to select an 
external advisor.  
INTRODUCTION 
A small firm is unlikely to possess internally the full range of knowledge and skills that it requires or 
could benefit from for the development of its business (e.g., Bryson and Daniels 1998; Hurmerinta-
Peltomäki and Nummela 2004; Smallbone, North and Leigh 1993). The ability to acquire suitable 
external expertise – defined as knowledge or competence that is rare in the firm and acquired from the 
outside – when needed thus becomes a competitive factor in itself. Access to external expertise enables 
the firm to focus on its core competencies and removes the necessity to internalize every skill and 
competence. However, research on how small firms access external expertise is still scarce (for 
exceptions, see Bennett and Robson 1999; Hjalmarsson and Johansson 2003; Ramsden and Bennett 
2005). The present study contributes to this under-developed discussion by analysing the role of trust 
and strong ties in the small firm’s selection and evaluation of sources of external expertise (henceforth 
referred to as the ‘business advisor’ or ‘advisor’).    
 
Granovetter (1973, 1361) defines the strength of a network tie as ‘a (probably linear) combination of 
the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie’. Strong ties in the context of the present investigation refer to sources of 
external expertise who are well known to the owner-manager, and who may be either informal (e.g., 
family, friends) or professional advisors (e.g., consultants, enterprise support officers, accountants or 
solicitors). Previous research has suggested that strong and weak ties have different fortes and the 
choice of business advisors could thus be critical to business performance (e.g., Burt 2000; Davidsson 
and Honig 2003; Jenssen and Koenig 2002).  
 
While previous research results suggest that small businesses favour previously well known business 
advisors (Berry, Sweeting and Goto 2006; Burke and Jarratt 2004; Ellis and Watterson 2001; Ramsden 
and Bennett 2005), prior studies have also pointed out that an excessive reliance on a network of well 
known actors might hamper business development, as the range of expertise available through strong 
ties is limited (Lageman 2001; Raiser 1999; Welter and Kautonen 2005). But are owner-managers of 
small businesses aware of this limitation and does it matter to them? Or does working with a well-
known advisor compensate for it? Hence, our research model first examines the impact of the strength 
of tie on the business advisor’s perceived performance.   
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 Next, we ask what encourages a small business owner-manager to seek advice from a strong tie. A 
recent exploratory study by Welter and Kautonen (2005, see also Bennett and Robson 1999; Bennett 
and Robson 2004) drew attention to the central role of trust in this context. However, while their study 
found support for the general proposition that trust plays an important role in the choice of advisors, 
how trust and its different dimensions actually affect this choice remained ambiguous. The present 
paper develops this discussion by considering the impact of the different dimensions of perceived 
trustworthiness, defined as benevolence, integrity and ability (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995), on 
the strength of tie. Further, we suggest that the dimensions of perceived trustworthiness relevant in the 
choice of a strong tie vary between professional and informal advisors.  
 
These propositions are examined empirically based on survey data comprising 153 Finnish small 
businesses. The data are analysed utilizing the partial least squares (PLS) approach to structural 
equation modelling with SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende and Will 2005). Being non-parametric, the PLS 
algorithm is particularly well-suited to analysing small datasets with non-normally distributed 
variables. 
   
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Accessing external expertise through strong and weak ties 
Literature suggests that a minimum of four stages are involved in the process of selecting the provider 
of external expertise (Gallouj 1997; Fitzsimmons, Noh and Thies 1998; O’Farrell and Moffat 1991; 
Stock and Zinszer 1987). The process commences with need recognition, then proceeds to the search 
for potential providers, an assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, and concludes with a decision 
to select one provider over the other alternatives. However, in many cases the stages are not followed 
(e.g., Gallouj 1997; Stock and Zinszer 1987) and only one potential provider may be considered 
(Johnston and Bonoma 1981; O’Farrell and Moffat 1991). This is particularly likely when a known 
provider is available, since an existing strong relationship reduces the perceived level of risk in 
acquiring external expertise (Johnston and Lewin 1996). Given the generally lower level of resources 
and purchasing professionalism in small firms (e.g., Boter and Lundström 2005; Morrissey and 
Pittaway 2004; Quayle 2002; Smallbone, North and Leigh 1993), it seems likely that they more often 
use the short-cut and acquire their external advice from a previously known source without considering 
alternatives. Indeed, some studies have suggested that small enterprises rely overtly on their immediate 
networks (e.g., Bryson and Daniels 1998; Viljamaa 2007), i.e. strong ties. This tendency has its pros 
and cons.  
 
Starting with the pros, social networks of entrepreneurs have been found to play an important role in 
the establishment, development and growth of small businesses (e.g., Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998; 
Chell and Baines 1998; Greve 1995; Lechner and Dowling 2003). Witt (2004, 394) explains the central 
argument of ‘the network success hypothesis’ (using a term coined by Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998, 
213) as being based on the proposition that entrepreneurs use their personal network to obtain 
information and resources at below market rates, and get access to such information and resources that 
they could not acquire on markets. Strong ties have particular advantages when advice is required on 
delicate matters or the entrepreneur needs mental, emotional or social support (Johannisson 1988).  
 
On the other hand, even if strong ties are convenient and efficient sources of advice when they are 
readily available, seeking such people is not always the most effective solution. For example, what if 
the owner-manager does not have anyone in their immediate social network to turn to for the particular 
type of expertise required, or even worse, they choose a personally known advisor who provides advice 
that does more harm than good to the business? Previous literature maintains that an exclusive or over-
extensive reliance on the network of closely known actors may hamper business development in the 
long run because the entrepreneur may miss out on knowledge, skills and opportunities external to this 
network (Lageman 2001; Raiser 1999).  
 
However, given that business owners, as any economic actors, are boundedly rational (Simon 1957), 
they may not be aware of the fact that they are making a suboptimal choice. Or, alternatively, being 
happy enough in the relationship with their current, known advisor owner-managers may perceive the 
advice received as sufficient (cf. the principle of ‘satisficing’ in Simon 1957). Furthermore, with expert 
advice, the owner-managers face a problem of knowledge asymmetry in that they may not be able to 
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 evaluate performance in an area of expertise unknown to them. This in turn can lead to emphasis on 
subjective cues such as likeability and interpersonal chemistry (Day and Barksdale 1992; Coulter and 
Coulter 2003), which would favour advisors with strong ties. Based on these arguments, we predict that 
owner-managers may not distinguish between the performance of informal and professional advisors 
when strong ties exist. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the tie between the owner-manager and the advisor, 
the more satisfied the owner-manager is with the advisor’s performance 
disregarding whether the advisor is a professional or an informal source of 
external expertise. 
The role of trust in the choice of a strong tie 
The definition of trust has been the subject of debate in a number of different literatures, but especially 
in the business context it is beginning to converge on the ‘willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ (Mayer, Davis 
and Schoorman, 1995, 712, see also Nooteboom 2002; Rousseau et al. 1998). The psychological state 
of trust can be based upon personal knowledge of the trustee or institutional context. Welter and 
Kautonen (2005) associated strong ties with personal knowledge of the contact or personal trust, while 
weak ties are more likely to require institutional trust, which is based on the regulations and norms 
prevalent in the business environment. Personal trust is an important aspect particularly in the selection 
of advisors, due to its role in reducing ex ante uncertainties (Bennett and Robson 2004). 
 
Personal trust, based upon the formation of a personal relationship, involves the development of 
perceived trustworthiness, as illustrated in the model of trust proposed by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 
(1995). Perceived trustworthiness is proposed to have three dimensions of ability, benevolence and 
integrity. Ability is the evaluation by the trustor that the trustee is capable of performing the actions 
that will be relied upon. Benevolence is an evaluation of the trustee’s motivations, such that the trustee 
has no ill will towards the trustor and that the trustee is genuinely concerned about the trustor’s welfare. 
For example, benevolence is likely to be higher when the trustor perceives goal alignment with the 
trustee. Integrity is the perception that the trustee is honest and will deal fairly. Some degree of ability, 
integrity and benevolence is necessary even when using a strong tie to access external expertise 
disregarding whether this individual is a professional or an informal advisor. Therefore we hypothesize 
that some minimum level of all three dimensions of perceived trustworthiness will be present when a 
strong tie is used to choose a business advisor.  
Hypothesis 2: Ability, benevolence and integrity will positively influence the use 
of strong ties in the choice of an external advisor. 
 
Beyond that minimum level, however, the emphases of the different dimensions are likely to vary 
between professional and informal advisors. Ability may be a basic pre-requisite for the choice of any 
advisor, but it may well be that if the minimum qualifications set by the owner-manager based on their 
bounded rationality are met, ability does not have further importance in the case of informal advisors 
and more subjective criteria such as benevolence are focussed upon (see e.g., Day and Barksdale 2003; 
Maister 2003). Besides convenience, entrepreneurs turn to family and friends not because they think 
these are the professionally most qualified people to advice, but because they are expected to have, 
through the personal relationship, a genuine interest in the help-seeker’s welfare. Therefore, it seems 
logical that benevolence is emphasized more in the context of informal advisors. Here, an existing 
close and most likely long-term relationship, albeit not necessarily in professional capacity, serves as 
proof of benevolence.  
 
On the other hand, professional advisors are, first and foremost, performing a service that they get paid 
for, and are sought primarily because of their competence or ability. Thus, we postulate that ability 
weighs more when choosing a professional rather than an informal advisor. A strong tie professional 
advisor will have had the opportunity to prove their ability during the time the strong tie has developed; 
a professional advisor that showed lack of ability would not have had the opportunity to develop such a 
tie in the first place.  
Hypothesis 3a: Ability will have a stronger relationship to use of strong ties when 
choosing a professional, rather than an informal advisor.  
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 Hypothesis 3b: Benevolence will have a stronger relationship to use of strong ties 
when choosing an informal, rather than a professional advisor. 
 
While benevolence develops as a product of cumulative personal encounters and transactions 
(professional or in another capacity) between the advisor and the owner-manager, integrity is also 
embedded in the broader business community in which these actors operate. Besides personal 
knowledge, institutional signals and reputation are likely to be used to evaluate a professional advisor’s 
integrity. Many advisor professions such as accountants, solicitors and government enterprise support 
officers are (self-)regulated by rules, norms and professional ethics (Bennett and Robson 1999), which 
generate institutional trust in their ability and integrity. Institutional signals of trustworthiness in this 
context include, for instance, professional certifications, trading standards, codes of conduct and 
memberships in professional associations (Bennett and Robson 1999; Sztompka 1999; Zucker 1986). 
Beyond such institutional signals, it may be difficult to assess the integrity of an individual professional 
advisor because ethical choices are often difficult to identify and evaluate. Hence one would tend to 
choose a professional advisor who is known to have a good track record for integrity. The track record, 
or the advisor’s reputation, serves not only as information of their past behaviour. A long-term track 
record of honest behaviour also signals that the advisor values a good reputation and is thus unlikely to 
behave in a manner that could jeopardize the reputation (cf. ‘shadow of the future’ in Axelrod 1984, 
see also Nooteboom 2002; Sztompka 1999).  
 
Such signals of integrity are not available for most informal advisors and, indeed, we suggest that they 
would not bear that much weight in the choice of an informal advisor either. We propose that 
benevolence could be a substitute for integrity and since benevolence is a more important consideration 
when turning to an informal advisor (Hypothesis 3b), the substitution effect is more relevant in the 
context of informal advisors. For example, even if the business-owner knew that Uncle Ernie cheats at 
cards, she knows that he would not be dishonest with her because she has known him for years and 
considers him to be highly benevolent towards her. Hence, we suggest that more emphasis on integrity 
is desirable when choosing a strong-tie professional advisor. 
Hypothesis 3c: Integrity will have a stronger relationship to the use of strong ties 
when choosing a professional, rather than an informal advisor. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
The following empirical analysis is based on data from a September 2007 survey of Finnish small 
enterprises (employing less than 50 people). Entrepreneurs were asked to provide information about the 
person they most recently turned to when they required external help, advice or support for their 
business. The sample was drawn from the Business Register maintained by Statistics Finland, which is 
a government agency that maintains and develops national official statistics. The Business Register 
includes all Finnish businesses (including sole proprietors) that are liable to pay value added tax, which 
is required of all businesses that generate an annual turnover of 8500 Euros or more. The sampling 
frame included all businesses that had registered in the period from 2000 to 2006, amounting to a total 
of 97,804 enterprises. A random sample was drawn and 1089 questionnaires were sent out by regular 
mail, which resulted in 153 usable responses (response rate: 14 %). Although missing values were few 
(five or less per variable), they were estimated by means of the EM (expectation maximization) 
algorithm in SPSS in order not to lose any cases in the final analysis. 
 
A little over a third (37.0 %) of the sampled firms had been established in the past two years, while the 
rest were more mature enterprises. Sole proprietors comprise 40.0 % of the total sample, while another 
53.3 % employ less than 10 people and are thus considered micro enterprises according to the EU 
classification (European Commission 2003). Thus, only a small minority of 6.7 % of the total sample 
employ between 10 and 49 people. This sample is typical of the Finnish small business population 
(Statistics Finland 2005). 
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 Measures  
Based on Granovetter’s (1973; 1985) conceptualization, the strength of tie was operationalized as a 
three-dimensional construct consisting of the depth of the relationship (how well the person is known), 
the frequency of contact and the embeddedness of the tie in a network of mutual friends and 
acquaintances. The scales for the three dimensions of perceived trustworthiness (ability, benevolence 
and integrity) were adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999). The scale for the advisor’s perceived 
performance was developed specifically for this study and it measured performance in terms of speed, 
creativity, appropriateness and cost. The construct scales are displayed in Appendix 1 together with the 
item measures and their means, standard deviations and loadings. Further, our questionnaire included a 
categorical variable that enquired whom the owner-manager had most recently turned to for external 
expertise. We dichotomized this variable by grouping friends, family members and former colleagues 
into informal advisors, and consultants, solicitors, accountants and enterprise support officers into 
professional advisors.   
Analysis 
The data were examined by means of the partial least squares (PLS) approach to structural equation 
modelling (Chin 1998; Wold 1985) utilizing SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende and Will 2005). While 
covariance-based methods of structural equation modelling (e.g., LISREL or AMOS) are more 
widespread, we decided in favour of the PLS approach due to its non-parametric nature which makes it 
suitable for analysing relatively small datasets with non-normally distributed variables (Chin 1998). A 
model such as the present one where a maximum of three independent variables predict a dependent 
variable requires a minimum sample size of just 30 observations for stable and reliable estimates. The 
data analysis process involved two main steps. First, we tested the hypothesized relationships on the 
whole sample (n=153). Second, an exploratory group comparison (Chin 2000) was conducted by 
running the same model for two subsamples: respondents who had recently turned to a professional 
advisor for advice, help or support (n=86) and those who had relied on informal advisors in this context 
(n=67).   
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Assessment of measurement models 
The model consists of five reflective constructs: perceived performance of the advisor, the strength of 
tie, and the three perceived trustworthiness constructs of benevolence, ability and integrity. For all of 
these constructs, all item measures show loadings of more than 0.7 in the aggregate sample so that no 
item measure had to be deleted (Appendix 1). The loadings in both subsamples were also satisfactory. 
Construct reliability was assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and average 
variance extracted. Table 1 displays these scores for the aggregate sample and both subsamples. All 
constructs show satisfying levels that are in keeping with the usual threshold values of 0.7 for 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability and 0.5 for average variance extracted (Chin 1998; 
Nunnally 1978). The only exception is the Cronbach alpha value for the strength of tie construct in the 
professional advisor subsample, which however is only marginally below the threshold value and 
compensated by a more than acceptable composite reliability. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Assessment of structural models 
In order to estimate paths between the variables, the path weighting scheme was utilized, being the only 
weighting scheme that explicitly considers the conceptual model directions of the causal relationships 
between exogenous and endogenous variables (Chin 1998; Lohmöller 1989). Following common 
conventions, the abort criterion for the iterative estimation process was selected as a change of the 
estimated values of just 10
-5
 percent between two iterations. In order to determine the significance of 
each estimated path, a standard bootstrapping procedure (Yung and Bentler 1996) was applied with 500 
re-samples consisting of the same number of cases as in the original sample. The same process was 
followed for the aggregate sample as well as the two subsamples. Figure 1 depicts the results of the 
three path models. 
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 Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Results show that all three models explain a satisfying amount of variance in both endogenous 
variables with R
2
 values ranging from 0.35 to 0.40 for the strength of tie and from 0.21 to 0.23 for 
advisor’s performance. This indicates an acceptable explanatory power for the model. Moreover, the 
Stone-Geisser-Criterion points towards the interpretation that all models are of satisfying predictive 
relevance, given that the Q
2
 values for both endogenous variables are clearly above zero in all three 
models. Therefore, an interpretation of the conceptual model’s causal relationships is possible. The 
actual structural relationships as indicated by the path coefficients and their implications in terms of our 
research hypotheses are discussed next.  
Results 
The path model shows that the stronger the tie, the more positively the advisor’s performance is 
perceived. Thus, Hypothesis 1, that use of a strong tie will be associated with higher perceptions of 
performance is clearly supported. 
 
In terms of the dimensions of perceived trustworthiness in the general model, benevolence is clearly the 
most significant (p < 0.001) predictor of the choice of a strong tie for external expertise. While ability 
also reaches a moderate level of statistical significance, integrity does not have a statistically significant 
impact on the choice of a strong tie. Therefore, it seems that trust in the ability and benevolence of a 
strong tie advisor are enough, while integrity is not emphasized. Hence, we found support for two out 
of three independent variables included in Hypothesis 2.  
 
However, the path coefficients differed between the professional and informal advisor subsamples. In 
terms of Hypotheses 3a-c, the results of the exploratory group comparison (Table 2) show that 
Hypothesis 3a regarding ability being associated with strong ties more pronouncedly when choosing a 
professional advisor was not supported. The relationship between ability and strength of tie was barely 
significant whether it was a professional or informal advisor. 
 
Hypothesis 3b arguing that benevolence is more strongly associated with strong ties in the context of 
choosing an informal advisor received some support because the path coefficient in the informal 
advisor subsample was much larger than in the professional advisor subsample. However, the 
difference in the group comparison was barely significant (p < 0.1).  
 
Hypothesis 3c postulating that integrity would be more strongly associated with strong ties in the 
choice of a professional advisor was supported. Not only is integrity positively associated with strong 
ties when choosing a professional advisor, but in fact it is the most important dimension of 
trustworthiness in this context. However, the statistically significant (p < 0.01) result that integrity is of 
no concern, or even negative, when using strong ties to choose an informal advisor is somewhat 
surprising. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
DISCUSSION 
The empirical analysis revealed a number of interesting, sometimes surprising results. Firstly, the 
results provided support for the proposition that the owner-manager will be more satisfied with the 
external expertise provided by a strong tie, disregarding whether this well-known individual is a 
professional or an informal advisor. The reasoning behind this proposition was not that the expertise 
provided by a strong tie would be better as such, but that the owner-managers value the support that 
they get from close ties due to the quality of the relationship or that they may be unaware of what 
alternatives there are in the market to access external expertise. What this means, however, is that the 
small business owner runs the risk of not getting the best possible expertise for the development of 
their business. An important limitation of the current study in this context is that we cannot link the use 
of strong ties to the performance and development of the business. For many businesses, it probably 
does not matter if they do not get the most competent advice, especially if the business is lifestyle 
rather than growth-oriented. Given the broad cross-sectoral sampling of the present study, most of the 
respondents own very small firms and are not likely to be very growth-oriented. An implication of this 
discussion for further research is to examine the impact of using primarily strong ties for accessing 
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 external expertise where the firms are likely to be growth-oriented, for instance in the high tech 
industries. Given that high-growth enterprises are an important catalyst of job creation and other 
positive economic externalities associated with entrepreneurship (Minniti, Bygrave and Autio 2005; 
Parker 2004), the potentially adverse effects of strong ties could have broader implications than 
performance at the micro level of individual businesses.  
 
The results concerning the roles of the different dimensions of perceived trustworthiness when using 
strong ties to recruit informal or professional advisors were somewhat unexpected. In general, 
benevolence was clearly the most important basis for trust, while ability also had some importance. 
Interestingly, integrity was non-significant in the general model. The lack of a significant connection 
between integrity and the use of strong ties can be explained when we look at the differences between 
the use of strong ties to select informal compared to professional advisors. Hence, when using strong 
ties to access external expertise for advice and help, it seems that small business owners, in general, put 
most emphasis on the criterion that the advisor is genuinely interested in their welfare. One explanation 
for the particular emphasis on benevolence when strong ties are used is that ability is known and taken 
for granted and is thus not considered as useful for distinguishing suitable advisors. Why ask for 
someone's help if they are not perceived to have the ability to provide it? Moreover, the ability sought 
in a strong tie may be this person’s tacit knowledge of the business (Bennett and Robson 1999), which 
may not be consciously used as a criterion when selecting advisors. Even if a previously unknown 
advisor may be perceived to be competent based on institutional trust signals such as professional 
certificates, codes of conduct and memberships in professional associations (Sztompka 1999; Welter 
and Kautonen 2005; Zucker 1986), no such institutional signal exists that would tell the small business 
owner that the advisor truly cares about the firm’s and its owner’s best interests. Therefore, it seems 
logical that it is the benevolence dimension of perceived trustworthiness that is emphasized in the 
choice of a strong tie.   
 
Interestingly, the group comparison of respondents who had chosen a professional advisor and those 
who had turned to an informal advisor the last time they needed help and advice, revealed that while 
ability was an equally important consideration in both subsamples, there were pronounced differences 
in the emphases placed on integrity and benevolence. When choosing a well-known informal advisor, 
benevolence was emphasized even more strongly than in the aggregate sample. This result was as 
expected because the very reason, besides convenience, why a small business owner turns to a friend or 
family member is that these individuals truly care about the owner-manager’s welfare. Benevolence 
played a lesser, but nonetheless somewhat significant role in the choice of a well-known professional 
advisor as well. This finding points to the interpretation that a long-term relationship between a 
professional advisor and a small business owner generates a feeling of mutual bonding and goodwill, 
which becomes a factor in the choice of this particular advisor when external expertise is required.  
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this analysis was that integrity becomes a significant factor in 
the choice of a strong tie professional advisor, while it has a negative impact in the context of informal 
advisors. The emphasis on integrity in the context of professional advisors could be due to the fact that 
owner-managers have had bad experiences with consultants, accountants or enterprise support officers 
previously, which is why they particularly value the fact that the current professional advisor, selected 
with a strong tie, is probably known through experience to be honest. Another explanation could be a 
general lack of trust by small business owners towards consultants and similar advisor groups as a 
profession (Kautonen and Welter 2005). Once the owner-manager has found a professional advisor that 
they have seen to keep their promises and behave in an honest manner, this evidence becomes an 
important criterion for turning to this particular advisor for external expertise.  
 
While we expected integrity to have a stronger relationship to strong ties when selecting professional 
advisors, we were surprised to find that integrity was negatively associated with strong ties when 
selecting an informal advisor. Could this mean that when informal advisors are selected using strong 
ties, and the entrepreneur knows the honesty of the individual, integrity may not be as relevant to their 
business relationship as in other situations where integrity is more difficult to assess? Alternatively, as 
suggested above, benevolence may substitute for integrity when advice is sought from a relative or 
friend. More research is needed on this aspect.  
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 CONCLUSION 
This research contributes to the theory of trust and the use of strong ties in the selection and evaluation 
of business advisors as a source of external expertise for small firms. Specifically we propose a model 
that relates the three dimensions of perceived trustworthiness to the use of strong ties and the perceived 
performance of informal and professional advisors.   
 
The results showed that the stronger the tie, the better the perception of the advisor’s performance, for 
both professional and informal advisors. Moreover, the results showed that benevolence – the 
perception that the advisor truly cares about the small business owner’s welfare – is the most important 
dimension of trust when using a strong tie to access external expertise. Benevolence was particularly 
pronounced in the selection of informal advisors, while integrity was a significant predictor of the use 
of a strong tie when choosing a professional advisor. Ability was somewhat important in the general 
model as well as in both subsamples.  
 
In terms of further research, it would be interesting to extend the model by adding other factors, such as 
convenience and proximity, to predict the choice of a strong tie. Similarly, more predictors could be 
added to examine the factors besides the strength of tie which influence how the small business owner 
perceives an advisor’s performance. Further research is also needed to examine the economic impact of 
the primary reliance on strong ties for external expertise. If the small business owner is unaware of 
other providers of external expertise outside their immediate network, could this limited and perhaps 
biased, suboptimal range of external expertise hamper the business’ performance? If it does, does this 
effect vary for instance between types of firms and industrial sectors? 
 
The findings of this study have some practical relevance to the enterprise support community. First of 
all, given that the strength of tie has a significant positive impact on the advisor’s perceived 
performance, this implies that small business owners appreciate working with advisors in long-term 
relationships. Therefore, advisors are well advised to invest into relationship building and maintenance 
in their work with small firms. Secondly, the results show that, especially in the context of professional 
advisors, the advisor’s perceived integrity and benevolence weigh more than ability. This again 
emphasizes the need to invest time and effort into building a personal relationship with the owner-
manager, rather than merely maintaining a professional image and credentials. Finally, this study 
demonstrates that the dimensions of perceived trustworthiness are orthogonal with different effects on 
the strength of tie and ultimately perceived performance.  This means that entrepreneurs and advisors 
should consider the specific dimensions of ability, benevolence and integrity, rather than rely on 
general perceptions of trustworthiness in their advice relationships. 
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 APPENDIX  
Means, standard deviations and loadings of the construct variables 
 
Variable (all measured on a 7-point Likert scale; translated from 
Finnish) 
Mean s.d. Loading 
Advisor’s performance (developed specifically for this study)    
The person I chose reacted quickly to my request for help. 6.07 1.00 0.77 
This person acted creatively in solving the problem.  5.52 1.27 0.87 
The help I received was appropriate to solving the problem at hand. 5.95 1.00 0.83 
The help I received had a good price/quality ratio.  5.95 1.23 0.84 
Strength of tie (based on conceptualizations in Granovetter 1973, 1985)    
How well did you know this person? 5.60 1.74 0.78 
Do you and this person have a lot of common acquaintances? 4.22 2.15 0.84 
How often are you in contact with this person?  5.43 1.55 0.81 
Benevolence (based on Mayer and Davis, 1999)    
This person is very concerned about my welfare 4.37 2.03 0.87 
My needs and desires are very important to this person 4.74 1.75 0.83 
This person would not knowingly do anything to hurt me 5.55 1.81 0.83 
Ability (based on Mayer and Davis, 1999)    
This person is very capable and able 5.72 1.22 0.92 
This person has much knowledge regarding my need for help 6.06 1.09 0.82 
I have confidence in this person’s skills and ability 6.15 0.84 0.86 
Integrity (based on Mayer and Davis, 1999)    
I have never had to wonder whether this person will stick to his/her 
word 
5.51 1.78 0.93 
This person has a strong sense of justice 5.41 1.70 0.90 
This person always tries to be fair in dealings with others  5.29 1.78 0.84 
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 Table 1 Construct reliability measures – Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability (CR) and average 
variance extracted (AVE) 
 
Construct Measure All Professional Informal 
Advisor’s performance 
Alpha 0.85 0.86 0.86 
CR 0.90 0.90 0.90 
AVE 0.68 0.70 0.70 
Strength of tie 
Alpha 0.74 0.66 0.81 
CR 0.85 0.81 0.89 
AVE 0.66 0.59 0.72 
Benevolence 
Alpha 0.82 0.76 0.87 
CR 0.88 0.84 0.91 
AVE 0.65 0.58 0.71 
Ability 
Alpha 0.88 0.88 0.86 
CR 0.92 0.92 0.90 
AVE 0.88 0.74 0.71 
Integrity 
Alpha 0.86 0.87 0.83 
CR 0.91 0.92 0.90 
AVE 0.78 0.79 0.75 
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 Table 2 Differences between path coefficients in professional advisor and informal advisor subsamples 
 
 Professional 
advisor 
(n=86) 
Informal advisor 
(n=67) 
Path coefficient 
ǻ 
SoT -> Advisor’s performance 0.47 0.45 0.02 
Ability -> SoT 0.17 0.14 0.03 
Integrity -> SoT 0.31 -0.15 0.46
**
 
Benevolence -> SoT 0.22 0.61 0.39
†
 
†
 p < 0.10; 
*
 p  0.05; ** p  0.01; *** p  0.001 (one-sided t-test with 151 df for the difference in 
path coefficients). SoT = strength of tie. 
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 Figure 1. Results – partial least squares path models for the aggregate sample (All) / professional 
advisors subsample (Prof.) / informal advisors subsample (Informal) 
 
Ability
Integrity Strength     
of tie
Benevolence
Advisor’s 
performance
0.18* / 0.17† / 0.14†
0.43*** / 0.22* / 0.61**
0.09 / 0.31* / -0.15†
R2 = 0.39 Q2 = 0.26 (All)
R2 = 0.40 Q2 = 0.24 (Prof.)
R2 = 0.35 Q2 = 0.26 (Informal)
R2 = 0.23 Q2 = 0.13 (All)
R2 = 0.22 Q2 = 0.14 (Prof.)
R2 = 0.21 Q2 = 0.13 (Informal)
0.48*** / 0.47*** / 0.45***
 
†
 p < 0.10; 
*
 p  0.05; ** p  0.01; *** p  0.001 (one-sided t-test with 500 df) 
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